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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

LORINDA KAYE HARDY,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 47033-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-10706

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lorinda Kaye Hardy pied guilty to one count of grand theft.

She received a unified

sentence of fourteen years, with two years fixed.
On appeal, Ms. Hardy contends that this sentence represents an abuse of the district
court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts. She further contends that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce her sentence in light of the additional
information submitted in conjunction with her Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On November 17, 2017, Lorinda Hardy was fired from her employment as a bookkeeper
for a small business. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.5.) Her employer
believed she manipulated the books such that she was able to skim $43,853.24 from the business
until she was fired in 2017. (PSI, pp.5-6, 13.) Ms. Hardy had worked for the business for
seventeen years. (PSI, pp.5-6, 13.) Ms. Hardy was addicted to methamphetamine and used the
money to purchase it. (PSI, p.6.)
Based on these facts, Ms. Hardy was charged by Information with two counts of grand
theft and one count of felony fraud by computer. (Aug, pp.1-2.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Ms. Hardy pled guilty to one count of grand theft. (Tr., p.5, L.9 - p.6, L.9; 2 p.11, L.12 - p.12,
L.14; R., pp.30-37.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (Tr., p.6,
Ls.7-9, L.17; R., p.32.) Ms. Hardy agreed to pay restitution and that restitution was not less than
$40,000. (Tr., p.7, Ls.5-18; R., p.32.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Ms. Hardy to a
unified sentence of fourteen years, with four years fixed, and the court retain jurisdiction.
(Tr., p.40, Ls.1-4.) Ms. Hardy's counsel asked the district court to sentence her to fourteen years
of probation. (Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.5.) However, Ms. Hardy was sentenced to fourteen
years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.30, Ls.18-23; R., pp.52-55.) Restitution was ordered for
$43,853.24, an amount the parties had stipulated to. (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-24; R., pp.56-58.)
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Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
2
The official transcript does not contain pagination or line numbers, thus, appellate counsel has
calculated these designations.
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Ms. Hardy then filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider the
sentence. (R., p.64.) The State filed an objection to Ms. Hardy's Rule 35 motion for leniency,
claiming that the sentence imposed was reasonable. (R., pp.65-67.) The district court denied
Ms. Hardy's Rule 35 motion without a hearing. (R., pp.68-69.) Ms. Hardy filed a notice of
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction and the district court's order denying her Rule 35
motion. (R., pp.59-61.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of fourteen
years, with two years fixed, upon Ms. Hardy following her plea of guilty to grand theft?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Hardy's Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fourteen
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Hardy Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Grand Theft
Ms. Hardy asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of fourteen
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). In
reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four
factors:
Whether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
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legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

Ms. Hardy does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by the exercise of reason, Ms. Hardy must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,
294 (1997). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Ms. Hardy's sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Ms. Hardy is addicted to methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.15-16.) She did not begin using
methamphetamine until she was
pp.16-17.) Ms. Hardy is

, when her mother passed away.

(PSI,

now, and has been using methamphetamine regularly, for the

last ten years. (PSI, p.9.) However, Ms. Hardy knows she is an addict and believes she needs
treatment so that she can remain sober.

(PSI, pp.16-17.)

At the time of her sentencing,

Ms. Hardy was enrolled in treatment for her substance abuse and had completed over twenty-two
hours of group therapy and attended fifteen group meetings. (PSI, pp.16, 51.)
Ms. Hardy suffers from depression and anxiety. (PSI, pp.14-15, 23; R., p.32.) The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that the trial court must consider a defendant's mental illness as a factor
at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
Ms. Hardy does have supportive friends and family to assist her in her rehabilitation.
(PSI, pp.10-11, 20, 40-43.) Ms. Hardy's husband, John, is a good source of support for her.
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Mr. Hardy wrote a letter of support to the court in which he described her as “a caring wife,
mother, and grandmother.” (PSI, pp.11, 42.) He wrote that Ms. Hardy counsels their adult
children on a daily basis and that Ms. Hardy was remorseful and embarrassed about this incident.
(PSI, pp.11, 42.) Ms. Hardy’s son also wrote a letter to the court to show his support for her.
(PSI, pp.12, 43.) Ms. Hardy’s friends and family describe her as “a solid person, hardworking
and trustworthy.” (PSI, pp.10, 41.) Several of Ms. Hardy’s friends wrote letters to the court.
(PSI, p.10, 40-41.) They believe Ms. Hardy suffered greatly when she lost her mother, “she
struggled to cope” and her criminal behavior was “due to her addiction.” (PSI, p.10.) Ms. Hardy
was described as “valuable member of our community”—someone who volunteered for Habitat
for Humanity, among other community service programs. (PSI, p.40.) State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family
and employer in his rehabilitation efforts).
Further, Ms. Hardy expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for her actions.
(Tr., p.5, L.9 – p.6, L.9; p.11, L.12 – p.12, L.14; PSI, p.6.) Ms. Hardy told the presentencing
investigator, “I feel that this was dumb and am very sorry to have wronged someone who had
given me the chance to work for a good company.” (PSI, p.6.) Ms. Hardy is very motivated to
pay restitution. (PSI, p.18.) At her sentencing hearing, Ms. Hardy expressed regret and told the
court and the victims how sorry she was for her actions. (Tr., p.29, Ls.15-200.) She told the
court:
Just, you know, I’m really sorry that I put my – well, the company that I worked
for in the position that I did. And I know what I did was wrong. And I believe
that by placing me on probation, it would give me a chance to pay back, not only
him, but also society.
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(Tr., p.29, Ls.15-20.)

Idaho recogmzes that some leniency is required when a defendant

expresses remorse for her conduct and accepts responsibility for her acts. State v. Shideler, l 03
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Hardy asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her. She asserts that had the district court
properly considered her remorse, substance abuse, mental health conditions, and her family and
community support, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Hardy's Rule 35 Motion For A
Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of Her Rule 35
Motion
Although Ms. Hardy contends that her sentence is excessive in light of the information in
front of the district court at the time of her April 11, 2019 sentencing hearing (see Part I, supra),
she asserts that the excessiveness of her sentence is even more apparent in light of the new
information submitted in conjunction with Ms. Hardy's Rule 35 motion. Ms. Hardy asserts that
the district court's denial of her motion for a sentence modification represents an abuse of
discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of
new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
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In support of her motion for a sentence reduction, Ms. Hardy submitted information that
she did not have medical insurance and took the funds, in part, intending to use them to pay for
her medical treatment. (R., p.64.) In denying Ms. Hardy's Rule 35 motion, the district court
found that, even with the new information that some of the money "may have also been used to
fund medical treatment," the sentence was appropriate. (R., p.68.)
In light of Ms. Hardy's revelation that the money was not only used for her
methamphetamine addiction but was also taken to pay necessary medical expenses, the district
court should have reduced her sentence. Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating
evidence before the district court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its
discretion in failing to reduce Ms. Hardy's sentence in response to her Rule 3 5 motion.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Hardy respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 7th day of October, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
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